TO understand our agro-economic matrix in Zimbabwe today, especially as regards food shortages and price increases on basic food commodities, one has to understand the ramifications of Western-contrived economic policies on indigenous Zimbabwean’s food-security over the last few decades. 

In the early 1990s, with the advent of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs), there was a strong shift in food security policies in Zimbabwe.  

Operations by the GMB were downsized and the closure of several collection points became the order of the day.  

It should also be noted that liberalisation (imposed by ESAP), brought about chronic unsustainable increases in food prices throughout the ESAP period (1991-1996). 

ESAP in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, was accompanied by a decline in incomes but increases in the price of food and other essentials as markets were liberalised.  

The implementation of ESAP also had a negative impact on small-scale and communal farmers as the removal of Government subsidies on agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser, and a reduction of public expenditure on agricultural extension services, increased the cost of production.  

As a result of the withdrawal of state involvement in marketing agricultural inputs, many small-scale farmers became dependent on middlemen, and were forced to sell their produce at below-market prices.

A six-month Strategic Grain Reserve, with a ceiling of physical stocks of 936 000 tonnes of maize and a floor of 500 000 tonnes, was established in 1995. 

In pre-independent Zimbabwe, strategic grain reserve covered a minimum of three years.

The launch of ESAP was immediately followed by a serious drought and an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 1992.  Although a food aid programme, supported by international donors, helped to contain the ensuing food insecurity, the severity of the drought undermined livelihoods and deepened poverty in many areas.  

Poverty in Zimbabwe continued to increase throughout the 1990s and by 1997, three quarters of the population were living well below the poverty datum line.

In late 1997, the price of many basic food items, including maize, bread and cooking oil, rose by between 17 and 42 percent.  

On January 19 1998, a further 21 percent increase in the price of maize meal sparked three days of riots across Zimbabwe.

Despite drought, studies showed that household food insecurity worsened during liberalisation.  

Although Zimbabwe was generally considered food secure in terms of national requirements, household hunger, evidenced by the fact that 30 percent of children under the age of five years suffered from chronic malnutrition, was prevalent.  

According to the World Bank, of the   250 million children under the age of five in Africa, one-third are stunted and less than one-quarter are enrolled in pre-school. 

In 1993, the average daily energy consumption declined from 2 233 kcal per capita in 1980 to 2 000 kcal per capita.  

The situation was expected to deteriorate through to 2010. (FAO 1997)

In the period 1970-1997, the daily per capita supply of energy fell in Zimbabwe, from 2 225 kcal (which was above the SADC average of 2 173 kcal in 1970), to     2 145 kcal in 1997 (below the SADC average of 2 224 kcal); a 14 percentage fall in per capita supply. 

In addition, the daily per capita supply of fats changed only by 6,8 percent for Zimbabwe, compared to the regional average of 16,9 percent, showing increased food insecurity for the country over the years. (SADC Human Development Report, 2000)

According to WFP, micronutrient deficiencies in Zimbabwe are widespread, including a 70 percent frequency of iron deficiency among children under the age of five, largely caused by poor dietary assortment. 

Drought-induced food insecurity in the country was unprecedented among the urban poor and many households in the food-deficit southern and eastern areas of the country.  Bilateral food aid to meet part of the import requirement was sought, notwithstanding the strained relationships between the Zimbabwean Government and the prospective donors.

As a result of the grain shortage, the Government abandoned grain exports and, in an attempt to achieve food security, reverted to interventionist policies.  

For example, Statutory Instrument 350, 1993, under the Control of Goods Act, required a permit for the importation and exportation of cereals.  

These import and export controls had been imposed and relaxed periodically. 

For example, in 1996, import controls on wheat were relaxed while export controls for wheat were relaxed in 1997, and more of the product was being imported.

In 2000, to mitigate climate change-induced hardships, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced incentives to enhance food security.  

An input credit scheme was put in place to assist the new smallholder farmers and undertook to review producer prices as production was expected to increase to about 2,5 million tonnes through these measures for the forthcoming season and thereafter increase to 3,1 million tonnes annually.  

This was seen as adequate to fully meet domestic maize needs, maintain a strategic reserve and expand exports. 

Notwithstanding all of Government’s efforts, however, the country faced continued widespread grain shortages. 

This necessitated the World Food Programme (WPF) to distribute 2 399 metric tonnes of food assistance to 706 247 people (January 2019) and continues to do so. Zimbabwe’s food deficit is currently over one million tonnes.

As part of measures for supporting market linkages for rural farmers, WFP Zimbabwe also procured 2 000 metric tonnes of sorghum of local origin that will constitute part of WFP’s regional prepositioned stock available for sub-Saharan countries in times of emergencies and increased demand. 

Prior to this time, the WFP’s only operation in Zimbabwe was a procurement office from where it purchased (excess) Zimbabwean grain for food aid programmes elsewhere in Africa.

As Zimbabwe continues to experience a number of unprecedented environmental and socio-economic challenges, it has resulted in more than 62,6 percent of Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line.  

This, according to the WFP, has contributed to a 2018 Global Hunger Index classification as ‘serious’. 

According to the World Bank Global Poverty Working Group: “National poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines. … compiled annually from official government sources … using national (i.e. country–specific) poverty lines …. from which it is possible to construct a correctly weighted distribution of per capita consumption or income. 

National poverty lines are the benchmark for estimating poverty indicators that are consistent with the country’s specific economic and social circumstances. National poverty lines reflect local perceptions of the level and composition of consumption or income needed to be non-poor.”

Dr Michelina Andreucci is a Zimbabwean-Italian researcher, industrial design consultant, lecturer and specialist hospitality interior decorator. She is a published author in her field.

For views and comments, email: linamanucci@gmail.com