IN the eye of the storm was the land issue at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979.
Rhodesians wanted Zimbabweans to buy back their land – land which they had been robbed of at gunpoint.
However, ZANU and ZAPU were very clear they would never buy their own land from usurpers.
For this reason, Rhodesians sought to increase their leverage at the talks.
They knew they had already lost the war, which was why they were at Lancaster in the first place.
However, desperate to cling on to the land they had mercilessly stolen from the people of Zimbabwe, they would do anything to reverse the gains of the 16-year liberation war.
Thus they sought to use Lancaster as a means to steal victory from the liberation forces instead of what it was, a negotiation of terms of surrender by those who had lost the war – the Rhodesians.
To do this, they chose to attack the ZANLA headquarters base at Mavonde, situated only 20km from the Mozambican border.
Nestled in the middle of the Mavonde mountains, it was an impregnable fortress.
The day was October 2 1979.
At the beginning of September, Rhodesians had lost the battle of Mapai — dismally.
They had retreated in shame, but still they could not believe the whiteman – the so-called ‘finest flower of civilisation’ – could be defeated by the ‘primitive and uncivilised’ African.
They planned to break into the base with armoured cars, pounders and cannons that destroyed everything before them.
This would be reinforced by heavy aerial bombardment, as at Mapai, to destroy ZANLA’s anti-air postage.
In addition, the Rhodesian Light Infantry would be parachuted around the base to set up ambush positions.
They were convinced they would make it.
ZANLA, however, was ready for them.
Their motto was: ‘No land, no ceasefire’.
They knew what was at stake at Lancaster; that for which they had fought for, for the last 16 years, and that for which they had buried so many at Nyadzonia, Chimoio and throughout Zimbabwe in many battles and massacres.
There were no civilians at Mavonde.
It was composed of military personnel only.
The base was well-defended.
According to Dr Felix Muchemwa, in his book The Struggle for Land in Zimbabwe – (1890 -2010): “ZANLA was
6 000 strong armed with a wide range of weapons from brand new AK riffles, RPD, light machine guns, RPG-7s, HMGs and permanently stationed along the zigzag of trenches at the top of the Monte Casino Mountain was the mortar 82mm base plate.”
In command of the ZANLA HQ Base at Mavonde was ZANLA’s chief of operations Cde Solomon ‘Rex Nhongo’ Mujuru.
His deputy was Cde Vitalis ‘Sheba Gava’ Zvinavashe.
He was also assisted by Cde Mavec Dube (Joshua Misihairambwi), as well as Cde Ndoda, the tactical commander.
The Rhodesian commander was Captain Richard Domford. As the Selous Scouts began the assault on Mavonde at 8am on October 2 1979, the bombardment by Canberras and Humus, as well as the invasion by Animas Column was met with a barrage of mortar 82mm fire and heavy machine-gun fire from RPG7s.
The assault was stalled and reversed and the Selous Scouts who had been captured revealed the plan had been to capture Mavonde in one day.
Still on the second day, spirited bombing of Mavonde continued, but ZANLA remained an impregnable fortress.
That morning of the second day, Huro bombers were shot down.
Still an assault by 40 Selous Scouts armed with NATO MAG guns was repulsed on this second day.
On the third day, the Rhodesians retreated to the safe altitudes aware that ZANLA anti-aircraft fire was deadly.
ZANLA forces were safe in their bunkers while the musasa trees and the vegetation bore the brunt of the bombing that afternoon.
Surprise reinforcement from FRELIMO with T-54 tanks, gave some relief to ZANLA forces.
The Selous Scouts retreated.
By midnight, anti-air gunners and the 82mm battery had run out of ammunition, so a tactical retreat was in order.
There was not much fighting on the fourth day serve to say Rhodesians had been defeated.
That was the end of their assault on Mavonde.
One Selous Scout sums it up: “We knew then that we could never beat them. They had so much equipment and there were so many of them.
“They would just keep coming with more and more.”
ZANLA had done it again.
The casualties were minimal.
Five lives were lost, while it is estimated Rhodies lost 120 lives and six fighter aircraft.
Once again, it was not the hand of Rhodesia which was strengthened at Lancaster, but that of the liberation forces.
The message was clear and unmistakable.
It was game over for General Peter Walls.