Recently in Bamako, Mali AN Algerian brokered deal signed by Mali’s government and separatists last week could mark an end to three years of political crisis that has hit the West African country. On Friday, the Mali Government, allied fighters and two factions of the Tuareg’s Coordination of Azawad Movement signed a landmark peace agreement in a ceremony attended by African Union (AU) Chairperson President Robert Mugabe and numerous heads of state. However, three principal factions of the Coordination of Azawad Movement, which includes the National Movement for Liberation in Azawad, High Council for the Unity of Azawad and Arab Movement of Azawad did not attend the ceremony. The Algeria-pushed peace, ‘Algiers Accord’, analysts say, will bring stability to the north, the cradle of several Tuareg uprisings since the 1960s and a strong hold for al-Qaeda-linked jidahists which have been regrouping since they were ousted by the French in 2013. In early 2012, Mali collapsed suddenly after a rebellion by Tuaregs in the north of the country. They unleashed a civil war, followed by a coup d’état. Regional violent Islamist groups took advantage of the unrest created by the civil war to take over the north, and a weakened army overthrew the government. The resurgence of violence in the north by the Tuareg movements left more than 1 000 people dead and forced displacements of more than half a million of civilians. Sharia Law was introduced and slavery re-emerged. There were reports of darker-skinned northern Bella and Tamasheq slave descendants being the first to be punished under Sharia Law or recaptured by their former masters. Malians have lived in a state of chaos and fear since the beginning of the 2012 crisis. The gut reaction of Bamako was to call the old colonial master in Paris as the provider of regime security.  The revolt of the Tuareg dates back to their fight for an independent state of Azawad during Mali’s transit to independence in the 1950s. Since the country eventually gained independence from France in 1960, Tuareg revolts have been repressed several times, fuelling their grievances against the state. Tuareg militants claimed they receive fewer state benefits than other groups. However, the recent conflict is not new. Northern Mali is originally the homeland of the Tuareg, a pastoralist group whose position in the Sahel was turned upside down by French colonialism. The Tuaregs who once controlled the inter-Saharan trade routes and saw themselves as ‘masters of the desert’ suddenly became minorities in several new states, and in Mali in particular, a minority ruled by the population they previously had viewed as ‘inferior’ and historically had directed slave raids towards. Although for much of the pre-colonial period there were many kingdoms such as the Songhai Empire throughout North and West Africa, the Tuareg moved freely throughout the region because most polities were without defined or enforced borders. The Tuareg managed trade routes for gold, ivory, salt, and black African slaves, and provided services to trade caravans throughout the Sahel. However, this changed when the French colonised nearly all of North and West Africa in the late 1800s, a region of immense ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity. The French found Tuareg dominance incompatible with their goal of expanding the French empire, and therefore sought to weaken the Tuareg stronghold. Restricted freedom of movement and seizure of arable lands contributed to Tuareg’s severe economic difficulty and the formation of deep-seated antagonism. The French also employed divisive strategies to establish greater control over the region, at times encouraging a sense of ethnic superiority in the Tuareg people. On the other hand, the French extended positions of authority only to ‘les évolués’ (the ‘evolved’ or ‘developed’) from within other African ethnic groups, without regard for the Tuareg population, an act of manipulation which had lasting consequences. When Mali achieved independence from France in 1960, the Tuareg immediately became a disadvantaged and under-represented minority ruled over by other groups, whom the Tuareg considered and arguably still consider their ‘inferiors’. Hence the Tuareg ‘problem’ has become Gordian knot, for the West African country, as it has experienced four Tuareg rebellions. The first Tuareg rebellion took place in the early 1960s, the second in the early 1990s, and as the National Pact of 1992 failed to produce tangible results on the ground, a new rebellion emerged in 2006. This was relatively small until armed Tuaregs many of whom had lived in Libya for years started to return to Mali following the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in 2011. Their arrival gave the rebellion new momentum and yet another Tuareg rebel movement was formed, the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Whereas Tuareg separatism previously had been a facade for other demands concerning power and positions, MNLA declared full independence of Azawad. The issue was no longer increased access to the spoils of the Malian state, but to break away from it. Six months into the conflict, the separatists gained control of much of Kidal Region and parts of Gao and Timbuktu regions in the north, including from Kidal town to Ménaka close to the border with Niger in the southeast. Simultaneously, an opaque ad hoc alliance between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and Ansar Eddine mounted a military offensive whose aim was to implement their interpretation of Sharia Law. At the same time Western powers are not excused from all this turmoil, as they have their own interests in intervening in Mali. In 2012, a new uranium mineral zone was discovered in the north of Mali. It has been claimed that France’s early military intervention was largely related to unexploited natural resources. The Dutch government has stated that the natural resources in the region need to remain available to European industry and trade. The Netherlands, together with Sweden, have sent most military support, both aiming at a seat in the UN Security Council.  Greater success in restoring long-term stability and security for the people of Mali and the Sahel as a whole can be achieved by addressing the root causes of the Malian conflict. And this is what the Algiers Accord ought to fix.