The pleasant but startling reports which President Samora Machel brought to the table ultimately helped the Frontline Heads of State to come to a well-analysed strategic decision on whether to continue the war in Rhodesia or not, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book, The Struggle for Land in Zimbabwe (1890-2010), that The Patriot is serialising.

Reserving the land issue as a matter for the sovereign state of Zimbabwe

MEANWHILE, as it later turned out, the British Government had submitted the Draft Constitutional proposals to the Frontline Heads of State who had tentatively accepted them, including the controversial land clauses under Section V. (Wiseman and Taylor p.9)
It was reported Sir Seretse Khama, the President of Botswana, broadly supported the British Constitutional Proposals.
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania also broadly approved the proposals, but supported the Patriotic Front insistence on a formula to facilitate land redistribution.
However, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and President Samora Machel of Mozambique were critical of Lord Carrington, and demanded the modification of the proposals on land. (Keesings, p.30169)
Consequently, Nyerere had proceeded to convene an urgent special meeting of the Frontline Heads of State in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania for a more informed decision on the matter.
The meeting was scheduled for October 17 1979.
In the meantime, on October 13 1979, the two Patriotic Front Vice-Presidents, Cde Simon Muzenda (ZANU PF) and Cde Josiah Chinamano (PF ZAPU), had taken advantage of the break and left London to consult with the Frontline Heads of State at the urgent special meeting convened by President Nyerere. (Keesings p.30169)
But, two days before the meeting (October 15 1979), Carrington made his move.
He informed the Patriotic Front that the conference would proceed to discuss the transitional period without their participation, if they refused to accept the British Constitutional Proposals. (Keesings p.30169)
Given that unbeknown to the Patriotic Front, the Frontline Heads of State had, behind the scenes, tentatively accepted the British Constitutional Proposals, including the controversial land clauses under Section V, the move was obviously and deliberately meant to isolate the Patriotic Front, and especially Cde Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF.
However, the pleasant but startling reports which President Machel brought to the table ultimately helped the Frontline Heads of State to come to a well-analysed strategic decision on whether to continue the war in Rhodesia or not.
In 1978, the FRELIMO army, the FPLM, had, on Machel’s direction, sent three military teams with about five men in each into Rhodesia, one to each of the ZANLA operational provinces — Tete, Manica and Gaza fronts.
Their mission had been to see for themselves what ZANLA had achieved on the battlefield. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: p.316)
In the Gaza Province alone, the FPLM commanders had advanced as far inland as Kezi and had, by September 1979, increased in number to 200 soldiers (Jackson and Malsen, 2011: pp.26-7) of which about 48 of them surrendered to the Rhodesian security forces (January 10 1980) in the Chiredzi area.
They were only handed over to Mozambican officials on January 16 1980 as part of the ceasefire agreement in Zimbabwe. (Herald, January 17 1980 p.1)
The FPLM commanders’ reports from all war zones inside Rhodesia were uniform in the claims that the ZANLA forces had established semi-liberated and liberated zones inside Rhodesia and consequently controlled most of the countryside.
The FPLM commanders also claimed most of the people inside Rhodesia were fully behind ZANU PF in the event there was to be an election. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: p.317)
While President Machel never believed that the Patriotic Front would succeed in negotiating for the surrender of land from the European settler-farmers (Tongogara – Briefings), he was confident that the Patriotic Front was going to win the elections in Zimbabwe.
Taking into consideration that the Patriotic Front had already been granted the most important part of the negotiations, which was the control of defence and security forces, President Machel believed the future Patriotic Front Government could use the acquired military powers to defend the gains of the liberation struggle as well as take over land by compulsory acquisition.
Therefore, once assured that the defence and security forces of the future Zimbabwe would be under the control of the Patriotic Front, the Frontline Heads of State, at the meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, resolved that the Patriotic Front leaders, Cdes Mugabe and Nkomo should immediately accept the Lancaster House Proposals in the Conference Paper No. 19 and reserve the land issue as a matter for the sovereign state of Zimbabwe. (Tongogara – Briefings)
That was the message the two Vice-Presidents, Cde Muzenda and Cde Chinamano carried back to London on October 17 1979.
On October 19 1979, the Patriotic Front returned to the conference room and announced:
“The great concerns we have over the whole land question – have been allayed by assurances of international assistance for agricultural and economic development programmes.” (Keesings p.30169)
By this, the Patriotic Front were referring to the British and American Governments which had offered substantial financial assistance for the Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe.
Cde Nkomo was optimistic and claimed that: “If the US had not stepped in, it would have been very difficult to move on this question (of land).
And, pledges of financial assistance for land reform went a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question.” (Tendi, 2010: p.77)
On the other hand, Cde Mugabe and Cde Tongogara were far from happy.
Given the major success stories on the battlefield at Mapai, Mavhonde and inside Rhodesia, to which FRELIMO and President Machel could bear witness, it was not surprising that the two were extremely bitter with the final position taken by the Frontline Heads of State in Dar-es-Salaam (Tongogara – Briefings), that is, their hurried acceptance of the resolution to the land issue in Zimbabwe.
Yet even so, Cde Mugabe still willingly accepted the Draft Constitutional Proposals Conference Paper No. 19, and signed the final Lancaster House Agreement on December 21 1979, paving the way to start preparations for the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement, including the Ceasefire Agreement.
Cde Mugabe later confessed:
“Yes, even as I signed the document, I was not a happy man at all. I felt we had been cheated to some extent… and that we had agreed to a deal which would to some extent rob us of the victory we had hoped to have achieved in the (battle) field.” (Mandaza, (ed). p 38)