After the final European settler-defeat at Umgusa on April 25 1896, the arrival of the imperial troops under General Sir Frederick Carrington changed the war situation in Matabeleland, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book The Struggle For Land in Zimbabwe (1890 – 2010) that The Patriot is serialising.

Gwanda District

IN the Gwanda District, the principal induna was Lobengula’s nephew, Manyakavula.
He lay low until March 27 1896, when a European settler patrol randomly opened fire on his people, killing many of them and setting fire on villages. (Grey in The ’96 Rebellions, rpt. 1975: p.6)
The provocation galvanised Manyakavula’s people and all the Ematshetsheni tribe of the Gwanda District into military action against the settlers.
On April 2 1896, Captain Brand reacted to (the) Gwanda crisis with a force of 100 mounted men, one Maxim gun and one doctor with orders to rescue any surviving European settlers into the Gwanda Laager.
On arrival, the settler-force was met with heavy fire from the kopjes and hills surrounding Manza Umnyama.
Heavily armed Manyakavula forces attempted several assaults on Brand’s forces, often from close ranges of 30 yards, but the enemy’s heavy Maxim machine-gun fire proved formidable. Yet, in spite of all that, the settler forces were still forced to retreat with the heavy casualties of six men killed, 15 wounded and 30 horses killed or lost.
All the dead could not be ‘casevaced’ from the battlefields during the hasty retreat.
By mid-April 1896, most First Chimurenga forces in the southern parts of Matabeleland had moved into more secure defensive positions in the Matopo Hills with large numbers of cattle driven from the syndicated European settler-farms.
The settler-counter-offensive was then directed towards the northern Chimurenga forces. (Grey in The ’96 Rebellions, rpt. 1975: pp.23-28)
Inyati
On April 4 1896, Captain Gifford was deployed on a search-and-destroy mission to Shiloh and Inyati.
He had one Maxim machinegun and a force of 100 mounted men and 39 Cape boys.
At Fonseca’s farm in Inyati, the settler force engaged and was pinned down by the Chimurenga warriors.
Recognising inevitable defeat by First Chimurenga forces, Gifford quickly sent for a relief force under Captain Macfarlane.
On Tuesday April 7, Gifford’s position worsened with the killing of Captain Lumsden, one of his commanders.
When Captain Macfarlane eventually arrived with reinforcements of 60 mounted men, guns and ammunition, the casualties in the humiliating defeat included three dead, six wounded and seven horses killed or lost and, the remnant force was only too eager to take a hasty retreat back to Bulawayo on April 8 1896. (Grey in The ’96 Rebellions, rpt. 1975: pp.24;30)
Umgusa River Valley
On April 16 1896, Captain George Grey led 42 mounted men on a forced reconnaissance in the Umgusa River Valley and discovered that a large force of Chimurenga warriors had taken positions in the valley.
Grey called for reinforcements and on April 19, Captain Macfarlane responded with a force of 94 mounted men and one Maxim gun, but the reinforcement was forced to retreat by a large force of Chimurenga warriors.
Captain Macfarlane in turn requested further reinforcements and Captain Napier responded with 129 mounted men, 100 infantry men, a 7-pounder, a Hotchkiss and a Maxim gun, but he too suffered heavy casualties leading to a request for even more reinforcements.
In response, Captain Bisset brought in 110 mounted men, 60 Cape Boys and 100 friendlies.
A further 115 mounted men and 70 Cape Boys were dispatched under Captain Macfarlane who had earlier retreated.
The last reinforcement brought the settler force mobilised into Umgusa Valley to a battalion strength of over 820 soldiers.
The ensuing contacts were intense, often at close range where only pistols could be used.
The Cape Boys were completely overrun by the Chimurenga warriors.
Captain Selous’ force was cut off from the main force and the entire European settler-battalion was routed on April 25 1896.
Badden-Powell admitted that the Umgusa battles were ‘disasters’ for the European settlers.
Yet in his report, Grey unashamedly gave the unbelievable casualty figures of five killed, five wounded and two horses killed plus all sorts of incredible excuses for the defeat. (Grey in The ’96 Rebellions, rpt. 1975: p.33)
After the Umgusa European-settler counter-offensive patrol disasters, Bulawayo was surrounded by nearly 2 000 Ndebele warriors armed with Martini-Henry rifles.
Also, 100 members of the Matabeleland Native Police deserted and joined other First Chimurenga warriors armed with Winchester repeater rifles and Lee-Metfords, elephant guns, Tower-muskets and blunderbuses in addition to assegais, knobkerries and battle axes, plus plenty of ammunition. (Badden-Powell,1897: p.35)
Arrival of British imperial troops
After the final European settler-defeat at Umgusa on April 25 1896, the arrival of the imperial troops under General Sir Frederick Carrington changed the war situation in Matabeleland.
The heavily strengthened European settler-force was then able to effectively patrol the open country and force First Chimurenga warriors into the defensive strongholds of Ntabazikamambo in the north and Matopo Hills in the south. (Ranger T.O. 1967: p.84)
Ntabazikamambo
Ntabazikamambo was a huge mass of kopjes and hills full of caves and shelters capable of containing thousands of people and animals and capable of sustaining a strong and protracted defence.
That is where Mkwati, Tengela and Siginyamatshe were assembled.
And, they were joined by Mpotshwana and his Nyamandhlovu regiment; Mtini and his Ngnoba regiment; Nkomo and his Jingeni forces.
They all retreated from their northern countryside operations including Umgusa.
Nyamanda and many members of the royal family also took defensive positions at Ntabazikamambo. (Ranger T.O. 1967: pp.229-231)
Meanwhile, that June in 1896, as the Chimurenga forces assembled at Ntabazikamambo, the settler-forces were also assembling at Colonel Plumer’s garrison at Inyati.
The assembled forces included the original settler-forces, the newly-arrived imperial force under General Sir Frederick Carrington and the newly recruited Corps of the ‘Cape Boys’ from the Cape Colony.
Cecil John Rhodes is believed to have also joined Plumer and his command for the battle desperately expected to reverse the downward trend of European settler-defeats ever since the First Chimurenga started in March 1896.
With D-Day being July 5 and on the night of July 4 1896 an array of the latest models of seven pounders, mountain guns, Hotchkiss’s, Maxim guns and dynamite explosives formed the formidable range of military weapons targeted against every single kopje and hill in Ntabazikamambo.
The fortress was stormed early dawn of July 5 and when the storming was over, more than 10 000 cattle literally flowed out of Ntabazikamambo.
Hundreds of fighting men, among them Nyamanda and Siginyamatshe who had earlier escaped during the night and trekked south to Matopo Hills, joined other commanders like Umlugulu, Sikombo, Dhliso and Umfezela already assembled there.
Mkwati, Mtini, Nkomo and Makumbi had also escaped during the night before the storming of Ntabazikamambo Hills and advanced into Somabula forests in the east.
Mpotshwana and his regiment escaped to the north, towards the Zambezi River, but he finally encamped around the Bembesi River Valley. (Ranger T.O. 1967:pp.230-3)
On the settler side, 10 European soldiers were killed and 12 were wounded while Chimurenga warriors had 150 killed and over 600 taken prisoner and these included women and children. (Badden-Powell: 1897: p.125)