. . . the need for regional co-operation
By Mupakamiso Makaya and Tapiwa Bere
PAST SADC protocols on health have, from time to time, enunciated policy plans to raise the regional standard of health for all citizens to an acceptable level by promoting, co-ordinating and supporting efforts of member-States to improve access to high-impact health interventions.
In various settings, SADC leaders have admitted that regional health policy in Southern Africa is still under construction. However, what is commendable is that policies and plans by SADC have laid the groundwork for health development.
Amid biowarfare and bioterrorism threats, what can regional associations do?
The answer is simple: There is a need for the creation of regional biological counter-proliferation strategy and action plans.
Indeed, biological threats need prompt and effective action!
Regional organisations have the potential to strengthen actions and counter the proliferation of biological threats.
This monograph guides SADC leaders and informs other agencies in biodefence of their recommended roles in biodefence and strategy efforts within a joint and multinational structure.
The need for an interdisciplinary approach is beneficial; technology enabling bioweapon development and proliferation requires an all-inclusive, interdisciplinary, inter-organisational and international approach to meet these biological encounters.
‘Rume rimwe harikombi churu’ is a proverb that loosely translates to ‘one man cannot comb an anthill’. Biological weapons are our collective anthill as SADC that needs to be dealt with, that cannot be done by Zimbabwe alone; it cannot be done by any member country alone. Success requires backing from and co-ordination with the diplomatic, information, legal and economic instruments of national powers.
SADC needs to meet biological threats through a plethora of diplomatic tools in a coherent and sustained manner as well as bio-arms control measures, deterrence and high-level engagement.
Proposed strategic objectives of SADC biological counter-proliferation, aligned to the public health functional areas of prevention, protection and recovery include:
l Preventing biological weapons development and acquisition: emphasising actions that deter our all-weather nemesis, and potential enemies from developing and obtaining biological weapons capabilities;
l Protecting against existing biological agents or bioweapons: with emphasis on engagements to reduce risks posed by existing biological threats;
l Recovering from nefarious biological agents use: with emphasis on activities that support operations in a biologically-attacked environment, to mitigate the effects of a wicked misuse of biological agents.
Achieving these objectives will require the following:
l De-escalating biological weapon development and acquisition;
l Managing existing biological weapon threats;
l Conducting proposed SADC force protection and consequence management;
l Appreciating the environment, threats and vulnerabilities;
l Maintaining and multiplying biological technical expertise; and
l Liaising with and supporting partners in biodefence.
Threats naturally, whether biological, social or political, interact and at times pursue the same agenda. It is not a secret that regime change agenda is on the cards, and the enemies and perpetrators are known.
The Bible says by their character you shall know them.
Geopolitical instability is a fertile ground for clandestine biowarfare. Because of geopolitical instability (for instance, States with bioweapons capabilities that are in civil strife or on the verge of collapse) biological weapons and dual-use technologies, materials, infrastructure and expertise may be captured or spread due to a lack of control, security and/or accountability. Adversaries may use geopolitical instability to circumvent the development process by gaining biological weapon production technology, skills and expertise. Individuals with crucial biological, technical or network knowledge may seek refuge from the perils of geopolitical instability through other State or non-State actors in exchange for mutual support.
In August 1997, SADC health ministers from Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, eSwatini, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia, in recognition that regional co-operation was essential in addressing the region’s health issues, converged to address the same.
This was justified by the realisation that regional co-operation was essential to addressing the region’s health issues. At the time, it was decided that South Africa would handle the health sector co-ordination, providing the secretariat needed to co-ordinate efforts. Despite international agreements, adversaries continue to develop and deploy biological weapons.
Biological agents, other CBRN materials and delivery systems are sought after by certain State and non-State actors, including terrorist groups that plan to use them against SADC countries covertly as a potent tool to further their objectives. Due in large part to the unrestricted flow of knowledge and scientific proficiency across national borders, numerous scientific advancements unintentionally contribute to these processes.
Adversaries may strategically use or threaten to use overt or covert biological weapons against the infrastructure, vital interests and populations of the SADC as a whole or in individual countries. Biological warfare is not just used during times of war. They might try to restrict freedom of movement or prevent access, making it more difficult for a SADC joint force to respond quickly to threats. They might also use intimidation to weaken support from important regional allies. The use of biological agents can have disastrous effects, so mitigation and active as well as passive defence mechanisms must be easily accessible.
If biological weapons are used, this permits joint forces to support SADC biodefence teams and allies while also enabling joint forces to carry out military operations in the event of a biological attack.
A methodical, co-ordinated, and synchronised approach capable of concurrently deploying multiple capabilities against actors and their illicit biological-related activities is necessary to counter biological weapons.
SADC acknowledges that lead agencies typically function as international organisations (IOs) under the auspices of the UN. Therefore, it is suggested that to improve their effectiveness in situations involving biological attacks or any other natural health challenge, SADC plans and carries out programmes and activities in close co-ordination with international organisations on a case-by-case basis, similar to what they did during the COVID-19 era.