One Hunter flown by Flight Lieutenant Brian Gordon was shot down and crashed just behind Monte Casino (north side), killing him since he failed to eject, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book The struggle for Land in Zimbabwe (1890-2010) that The Patriot is serialising.

Day Two
ON October 3 1979, the second day of the raid, heavy ZANLA anti-aircraft fire inhibited precision bombing at 1 000ft.
The Canberras were forced to drop their 1 000lb alpha bombs from the medium level bombing height of 15 000ft and they were ignored.
Comrade Nhongo had instructed ZANLA anti-aircraft gunners not to waste ammunition on aircraft flying above 5 000ft.
However, the Hunters continued their dive bombing manoeuvres, assaulting the anti-aircraft positions with the 68mm rockets and 30mm cannon fire as well as golf bombs and, they met appropriate responses from ZANLA anti-air gunners. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.116)
That morning, one Hunter flown by Flight Lieutenant Brian Gordon was shot down and crashed just behind Monte Casino (north side), killing him since he failed to eject. (Jackson and Malsen, 2011: p.146)
Later on, the same day, the Canberra pilots, believing that ZANLA anti-air gunners were not responding to Canberra bombings because they were scared came in lower than 5 000ft and the ZU-23mm anti-air gunners could not miss the large, darkish white targets and one bomber, flown by Flight Lieutenant Kevin Peinke with Air Lieutenant J. J. Strydom as navigator was shot down and crashed outside Mavonde, killing both. (Jackson and Malsen, 2011: p.146)
The ZANLA forces, well dug-in, in the trenches on the northern part of Monte Casino, became apprehensive, fearing that the falling pieces and debris of shot down bombing jets might land on their positions. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.117)
Still on the same day, about 40 of the Selous Scouts armed with FN and M16 rifles supported by the notorious NATO MAG guns and mortar 60mm, tried to assault the ZANLA HQ Base from the eastern slopes of Monte Casino Mountain, this time without the UNIMOG armoured cars.
The tortuous advance up the mountain, against well-armed dug-in ZANLA forces found the Selous Scouts being repulsed every step of the way up, and then eventually being pushed north-west of Monte Casino, unable to capture the mountain.
Remembering that stage of the battle, one of the Selous Scouts later admitted:
“We knew then that we could never beat them.
They had so much equipment and there were so many of them.
They would just keep coming with more and more.” (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: pp.165-166)
ZANLA ‘machine gun and mortar fire against the Selous Scouts advance was well controlled and accurate’. (Cole, 1984: p.357)
The Selous Scouts had to be airlifted by helicopter back to their temporary HQ on the eastern side of Monte Casino. In the process, an Allouette III helicopter K-Car was shot down. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.117)
Throughout the night on the second day of the fight, the artillery duel of the first night was repeated, only this time, the bombardment started from the Rhodesian Selous Scout HQ, east of Monte Casino and it was not intended to knock out any target.
Rather, it was meant to keep the ZANLA guerillas fully awake and harassed the whole night, thus wearing them down to a point of being unable to resist further assaults. (Nhongo)
Day Three
On the third day of fighting, much of the excitement on both sides had subsided and caution prevailed.
The Canberras were back to the safe 15 000 to 21 000ft altitude and were deploying both the 1 000lb alpha bombs and the 500lb napalm bombs to carpet-bomb Mavonde in a ‘scorched earth’ strategy.
Everything inside the Mavonde ZANLA HQ Base had to be pulverised by the alpha bombs whose toxic emissions were further expected to suffocate ZANLA forces in their trenches and bunkers.
However, the Canberras were completely ignored and met with total silence from the anti-air gunners.
Cde Nhongo’s standing order was still not to waste ammunition on aircraft flying beyond 5 000ft.
Therefore, it was only the Hunters’ diving manoeuvres that ‘drew curtains of flak from the (ZANLA) anti-aircraft positions on the hilltop and in the trenches’. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.116)
And on the whole it was the musasa trees rather than the ZANLA forces in the trenches and bunkers that suffered the bombing.
But, there was still no rest for the fighters because the interludes between aircraft strikes were always well-filled in by the artillery barrages.
A surprise FRELIMO intervention with T54 tanks in the afternoon disrupted the routine of the fighting.
The FRELIMO T54 unit advanced into the Mavonde ZANLA HQ Base, from the eastern side of Monte Casino, guided by Comrade Moffat (Masabeya), a ZANLA member of the General Staff and permanent medical representative at the Chimoio Hospital.
The reinforcement was immediately challenged by the Rhodesian 25-pounder guns and the Eland armoured cars’ 90mm guns and the ensuing duel went into the night in which FRELIMO tactically retreated back to Chimoio, having been outgunned. (Cole, 1984: p.357)
By midnight on the third day of fighting, ZANLA (critically anti-air gunners and Comrade Belingwe’s mortar 82mm battery) had exhausted their ammunition and Commander Nhongo ordered a tactical retreat. (Nhongo)
Comrade Belingwe was ordered to give cover to the retreating ZANLA forces by keeping the Rhodesian artillery busy.
The anti-air guns were dismantled for easy transportation and wheeled out. So were the recoilless guns.
Senior members of the ZANLA High Command and General Staff were assigned command duties to lead the 6 000 strong ZANLA force in large, battle-ready fighting formations out of Mavonde, many strong positions being held up until the right moment to withdraw. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.117)
Front squads were not to engage the enemy unnecessarily to avoid night battles since Rhodesians not only had night vision equipment but also had developed night fighting capability.
Against the orderly fighting retreats, the RLI, sitting in their ambush positions could not (without air support) dare challenge the heavily armed ZANLA forces and, consequently, there were extremely few and unsustainable contacts during the withdrawal.