A scorched earth policy was adopted by whites and African villages, including crops in the field, were burnt to ashes, thus denying Africans, including women and children, any form of food and shelter, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book The Struggle For Land in Zimbabwe (1890 – 2010) that The Patriot is serialising.

ON June 20 1896, Makoni and Mangwende launched a two-pronged, simultaneous offensive on Headlands and Marandellas (Marondera) respectively.
Around Chiduku and Madziwa Villages, five miles from the Headlands, Makoni’s forces killed Basson, Hitchman, Metcalf and Richards, all of them traders and farmers. (Hole, rpt. 1975: pp.138-142)
They had earlier on descended heavily on European settler-farmers between Odzi and Macheke Rivers, but only managed to seize the white settler-cattle because, sensing danger, most settlers had on Taberer’s orders already escaped into the Headlands Laager which was well-defended by the Burghers by June 20 1896.
Simultaneously, Paramount Chief Mangwende’s First Chimurenga warriors, commanded by his son, Muchemwa, assaulted Marandellas town.
The attack was concentrated on the Native Commissioner’s Camp at Marandellas Store where most local white settlers had taken refuge. (Ranger, 1967: p.193)
Still on the same day, and unaware of the attack on Marandellas, Native Commissioner W. Edwards rode from Headlands to secure the ammunition stores in Marandellas.
He rode straight into an ambush, but managed to escape into the besieged Marandellas Store.
The next day, June 21 1896, Edwards again managed to escape back to Headlands where he rejoined Taberer and other white settlers who included women and children as well as the Native Police in the Headlands Laager.
That night of June 21 1896 in Headlands was a nightmare to the Headlands Laager occupants as they faced wave after wave of assaults by the combined forces of Makoni and Mangwende.
Early on the morning of June 22 1896, Taberer led their escape, barely managing to reach Umtali (Mutare) on the same day. (Ranger T.O. 1967: p. 193)
By July 24 1896, the roads between Hartley (Chegutu) and Salisbury (Harare) had been completely blockaded by Paramount Chief Mashayamombe’s First Chimurenga warriors and communications between Salisbury and Umtali were under the control of Paramount Chiefs Svosve, Chihota, Mashonganyika, Seke, Chikwaka, Mangwende and Makoni.
Earlier attempts to patrol and clear these communications and trade routes had met very effective ambushes laid by First Chimurenga warriors. (Ranger T.O. 1967: p. 269)
The Shona onslaught on European settlements had paralysed the communications system and trade routes to Beira and Salisbury would remain completely cut off from the sea until the imperial column landed at Beira to clear the road to the besieged towns in mid-July 1896. (Ranger T.O. 1967: p. 194)
White settler counter-offensive and the conquest of Mashonaland
At the beginning of the First Chimurenga in mid-June 1896, much of the white-settler reaction to the uprising had been rather sporadic, unco-ordinated and disastrous; becoming co-ordinated only after the initial shock and awe had begun to wear off after July 23 1896.
The counter-offensive, directed mainly at clearing communication routes between Hartley, Salisbury and Umtali which were all under blockade was bitter, merciless and vengeful, giving no room for captives.
Shona servants and ‘forced’ labourers were rounded up, court-martialled and executed, in a procedure which Judge Vintcent arrogantly described as ‘arbitrary power in the interests of the general public’. (Ranger T.O. 1967: p. 268)
It is worth noting that while Cecil John Rhodes negotiated peace in Matabeleland in 1896, no peace overture to speak of was made to any Shona chiefs or their spirit mediums. (Palmer p. 63)
Conversely, the leaders of the rebellion in Mashonaland — paramount chiefs as well as national and regional spirit mediums — were all required to be shot on sight even under conditions of surrender.
A scorched earth policy was adopted and African villages, including crops in the field were burnt to ashes, thus denying Africans, including women and children, any form of food and shelter.
Thousands of refugees ended up in the open, on the mountains, hills and kopjes.
In the mountains, weapons of mass destruction, in particular seven-pounder and mountain guns, as well as dynamite charges were mandatorily and deliberately used against huge concentrations of predominantly unarmed African refugees. And, even though humanitarian organisations in England raised an outcry against the use of these weapons of mass destruction of that time, the Rhodesians and indeed the imperial forces took no heed. (Ranger T.O. 1967: pp. 277-283)
Hundreds of wagons were sent to collect thousands of tonnes of looted grain from African villages to feed the starving white settlers who had not grown much food for themselves despite having grabbed huge tracts of land from the Africans.
Animals, including cattle, goats, sheep and chickens were all rounded up and looted.
The looting was being used as a blunt military instrument of deprivation and starvation of Africans intended to force them to surrender.
Yet, ironically, it was the food shortages among the settlers that eventually forced the imperial forces to withdraw and return to England in November 1896, which was earlier than originally planned. (Hole, rpt. 1975: pp.70-74)
Counter-offensive by Captain Beal in Salisbury District
The first co-ordinated European counter-offensive was launched by Captain R.Beal who commanded a battalion of 800 men made up of 600 white settlers and 200 Africans with weaponry that included seven-pounder and maxim guns.
The objective was to clear the east of Salisbury District.
On July 23 1896, the battalion advanced into Chief Kupara’s area and engaged First Chimurenga warriors concentrated in the Kupara Valley.
More than 20 villages were burnt to ashes and more than 50 cattle, 180 goats and 300 bags of grain were looted.
The following day, the looted food was collected in more than six large wagons.
At Reimer’s Farm, the whole of July 28 1896 was spent in fierce skirmishes which Beal only won after adopting the genocidal scotched-earth policy.
Paramount Chief Makumbi’s village was burnt to ashes and hundreds of innocent civilians killed.
Twenty-three warriors were killed and an assortment of rifles, including 14 muzzle-loaders were captured.
On July 29 1896, Captain Beal deployed Commandant Smith with a force of 60 settler-volunteers and 150 Africans to clear the Salisbury/Umtali road up to Bromely, 28 miles from Salisbury City.
Smith returned on August 2 1896 with large quantities of looted grain. (Hole, rpt. 1975: pp.70-71)