THE struggle to overthrow Ian Smith’s Rhodesian regime had gained momentum after the Altena Farm attack in December 1972.
The onslaught in the north-east front of Rhodesia had reached its peak by mid-1974.
Many farms were attacked and a number of white farmers and Rhodies were killed.
There was a general intensification of hostilities on all war fronts from Zambia to Mozambique.
As of July 1972, FRELIMO had opened up a new front against the Portuguese in the Manica and Sofala provinces of Mozambique.
The new front led to an intensification of the war, coupled with the Lisbon coup which led to the ultimate fall of the Portuguese Government.
The fall culminated into the withdrawal of Portuguese soldiers from the operational zones inside Mozambique by the end of 1974.
A black Government in Mozambique brought the prospect of a 1 000 more kilometres of border territory opening up to guerilla infiltration, hence the defeat of the Rhodesian regime on the battlefield was only a matter of time.
Should Rhodesia fall, there was a greater likelihood of South Africa being engulfed in the armed conflict by ANC’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK).
But as the struggle intensified, so were the attempts to cripple the war.
However, one of the most crippling was the period of Détente.
South Africa’s then Prime Minister, John Vorster, assessed the situation and realised that his country and Rhodesia were about to be plunged into a catastrophic and devastating war by the Marxist and Communist revolutionary forces of ZANLA, ZIPRA and MK forces backed by the Soviet Union and China.
To Vorster, the geo-politico-strategic map of southern Africa, from Angola to Mozambique and Rhodesia, was rapidly changing and threatened the existence of the bastion of apartheid South Africa.
Hence the need for a non-military solution to the conflict; Détente.
Détente period saw a series of meetings organised by Vorster and it presented a false hope for a peaceful settlement to the internal conflict in Rhodesia.
Although the Détente initiative failed, its key objective of weakening the liberation struggle was highly successful.
The Détente exercise was a trick by Vorster to stop the war and at the same time fool well-meaning African leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
While the Frontline States pursued Détente, the Rhodesians developed a strategy to destroy the guerilla from within, to subvert and divide the liberation movement until it ceased to be a force.
Whereas the liberation movement stuck to the terms spelt out by the ceasefire, the Rhodesians continued with their war efforts.
Taking advantage of a lull in the armed struggle for that period of the year 1975, John Vorster had instead helped Smith strengthen his armed forces.
He also helped Smith restock ammunition and supplies.
Instead of stopping the creation of death squads, Vorster helped Smith to create the killer squad military outfit RENAMO.
His apartheid Government went on to give direct support to the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Airforce.
Rhodesian Security forces had to regain the psychological as well as the military ground that the guerillas had lost during the ceasefire period and it was an uphill struggle.
For the guerillas, 1975 was also a very trying time.
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other organisations were bound by the terms of the Détente to desist from providing military and food supplies.
The transit of arms and ammunition through Zambia was reduced to a smuggled trickle as Kaunda’s Government was committed to Détente.
Those crossing from Mozambique were disarmed.
For the guerillas still active inside the country, there were serious problems of sheer survival.
Most of the military and political leadership had been locked up in Zambia and Chairman Herbert Chitepo was dead.
After a communication blackout with the rear, freedom fighters were totally isolated, unable to get food supplies, armaments and other basic necessities such as medicines.
Without any rear support, they were likely to be wiped out.
The Rhodesians were able to add to the confusion early in the year by circulating ceasefire leaflets telling guerillas to hide their weapons and surrender to the nearest soldier, policeman or district commissioner or leave the country.
If caught with weapons, the leaflets said, they would be treated as enemies.
Smith had managed to disarm the majority of guerillas both within and outside Rhodesia.
With over 1 000 being held at Mboroma in Zambia, several thousand more immobilised in military camps in Tanzania and a few hundred more immobilised in Mozambique, wiping out the remaining 300 guerillas within the country was a fairly easy task.
He therefore set about a programme of extermination.
“But this involved attacking the people, particularly peasants in the areas near the borders of the country,” notes Fay Chung in Re-living the Second Chimurenga.
“The Smith forces attacked with increasing ferocity in a desperate attempt to wipe out all support for the guerillas.”
Over the few months, many were captured and others killed or wounded in concentrated enemy action.
By late 1975, the Détente exercise had brought the liberation struggle to a virtual standstill, as Smith hoped it would, and the Rhodesians estimated there were only three groups with about 10 men in each still active inside the country.
According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, guerilla commanders said the figure was slightly higher but admitted that of a force of more than 400 early in the year, about half had been killed and most of the remainder had retreated to Mozambique.
Instead of the so-called ‘Détente’ becoming an era of peace and racial harmony in Rhodesia and southern Africa, it became an era of disasterously terrible proportions for all Zimbabweans.
For the guerillas, it was indeed an act of betrayal.
With the opening of the Mozambique border in 1975 and 1976, there was an influx of young women and men who were crossing into Mozambique.
The trickle of recruits of earlier years turned into a flood as recruits were crossing into Mozambique at the rate of about 1 000 a week.
On July 25 1975, the Rhodesian Government announced a curfew from dusk to dawn along a one-kilometre-wide strip stretching 400km along the Mozambique border.
The following month, a similar curfew was announced covering a five kilometre-wide strip along 640km of the Botswana border.
These new recruits faced a severe shortage of food and plates, recruits had to receive what little food there was on leaves or in their bare palms.
There was also serious shortage of guns and ammunition, making it difficult to exploit the many military opportunities that presented themselves.
Thousands of young men were hanging around without food and arms and they were quickly becoming disillusioned.
Cde Jekanyika Munetsi said during that period, there was no war or operational activity.
“It was the most painful period of the liberation struggle because there were no food supplies and many comrades had to preserve the little ammunition they had,” Cde Munetsi said.
“The war was literally at a standstill and for many who came to the war that time had to have courage and proper orientation because they were coming from a normal life to poverty.” (sic)
It was even worse for women, as they had no sanitary wear.
“Imagine we would go for days or even a week without bathing,” said one woman, Cde Sekai.
Cde Brooks Chinembiri also said: “The Détente period had no resupply lines and there was no training.
The period literally stopped the armed struggle.”
Cde Pam Pam Disaster said: “The Détente period was meant to fool the liberation movements by applying cosmetic changes to the Smith regime and mobilise African support for the internal settlement.”
Upon realising they had been duped, the guerillas began chants of “Pasi ne Détente!” (Down with Détente!).
Thus the formation of ZIPA and the renewal of supplies saw our liberation war cadres fighting with renewed vigour.
That is why on Tuesday next week we shall be celebrating our 37th Independence Day anniversary.