FROM November 23 1977 after the Chimoio Massacre, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces intensified the war.
When the war broke out, Rhodesians’ plans were to deny ZANLA the ‘ground of tactical importance’, which meant closing off rural areas as places from which guerillas mounted attacks on crucial Rhodie assets.
The Rhodesians sought to protect ‘vital asset ground’ containing economic assets such as mines, fuel dumps, factories, key farming areas, bridges, railways and other installations.
And the Chimoio attack was part of a strategy to raid neighbouring countries, particularly Mozambique and Zambia, to disrupt ZANLA and ZIPRA’s command and control, to destroy base facilities, ammunition and food supplies, to harass the reinforcements and hamper the movement of guerillas.
All these strategies spectacularly failed.
Even the Chimoio attack, one of the biggest Rhodesian operations, meant to cripple the ZANLA forces could not drive back the guerillas.
In fact, after the attack, thousands continued to troop to Mozambique to receive military training, while thousands of trained cadres were unleashed on Rhodesia.
From the ashes of Chimoio, the guerillas rose like the mythical Phoenix from the ashes.
And the Rhodesians suffered not only from the stress and fatigue of increased fighting, but loss of manpower as many whites began to emigrate at the rate of 2 000 a month, mostly to apartheid South Africa.
Liberated zones increased and Rhodesian forces thinned on the ground, while ZANLA, even after the Chimoio attack, had more than 10 000 trained men within Rhodesia.
And these continued closing in on Rhodesians as they gained control of the rural communities and were now encroaching on the urban centres.
Rhodesia started to use Auxiliary forces, black soldiers belonging to the sellout Abel Muzorewa who had gone into an unholy alliance with Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith.
The effort to deny ZANLA forces ground was futile, the Auxiliary forces could not re-establish civil administration nor could they destroy the link between the guerillas and the masses.
According to authors of The Rhodesian War — A Military History, Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin: “As the number of guerillas increased, so did the extent of penetration and disruption of the Government infrastructure in the south-east… In 1977 the Government admitted that 22 000 tribesman in four administrative areas had refused to pay their taxes…also ZANLA raids grew more daring.”
The raids into Mozambique and Zambia, according to the authors, did little to deter the offensives of both ZANLA and ZIPRA forces.
“On October 23 1978, General (Peter) Walls admitted: ‘We have not only had a hard job containing them (the guerillas) but in some areas we have slipped back’,” writes Moorcraft and McLaughlin.
“On November 11 1978, while Smith was celebrating the anniversary of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), guerillas launched an attack on the exclusive Umwinsdale suburb of Salisbury (Harare).”
By 1979, Rhodesia was in what was largely described as dire straits.
“ZANLA had infiltrated beyond the Bulawayo-Plumtree rail line. The cities were being surrounded and ZANLA believed they would fall like ‘ripe plums’…in some areas ZANLA and ZIPRA were co-ordinating their strikes. ZANLA was preparing to establish formal liberated zones.”
The guerilla operations were now taking place in cities while planes were being downed at airports like the Viscount aircraft in 1979.
And while Rhodesian military leaders began to bicker, guerilla commanders were orchestrating the war like maestros.
“A feeling of sullen, resigned anger pervaded the white community, which retreated further into its laager. The roads were unsafe even for convoys, now the sky was dangerous too,” writes Moorcraft and McLaughlin.
“The Rhodesian strategy had always relied upon sound morale and leadership. But by 1979 the prospect of black rule…had sapped white resilience. Grit had been transformed into mechanical resignation. Worse was the fighting within the Rhodesian Forces (RF)…The senior officers of the army were at loggerheads over military developments.”
Feeling the heat of the war, the senior officers of RF were turning on each other.
“An incident in January 1979 exacerbated their strategic (and personal) schisms. On January 29 a bugging device was discovered in Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly’s office (commander Selous Scouts).
“All Selous Scouts and SAS operations were immediately suspended. Two days later Reid-Daly launched a personal attack on the army commander, Lieutenant General John Hickman… ‘If I ever see you again, it will be too soon’… The two antagonists immediately squared up for a fight, but senior officers managed to separate them.”
Despondent and sapped of morale, the RF top brass was now engaged in big game poaching lining their pockets in preparation for exit from Government.
“The Reid-Daly/Hickman row had dredged up many murky facts about the army. There followed a welter of accusations and counter-accusations of gun-running and poaching. (Most prominent was the accusation that the Selous Scouts were using the no-go areas, from which other army units were excluded, to poach big game rather than hunt guerillas,” writes Moorcraft and McLaughlin.
Meanwhile, Tete Province was, from 1977, under the command of Air Marshal Perence Shiri ably assisted by Cde Anderson Huru, Manica Province was directed by Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services Commissioner-General Paradzai Zimondi while the Gaza Province was under Fred Matanga.
By the close of 1979, these disciplined and able guerilla commanders had ensured that all rural areas were liberated zones and had unleashed so much heat that the Rhodies called for talks.
The war was getting into the then Salisbury from areas such as Domboshava, Seke, Goromonzi, Chihota, Mhondoro and Kadoma. After the Chimoio Attack and the period

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