AFTER the bombing of Chimoio ZANLA Camp on November 23 1977, the comrades were down, but not out.
They had suffered a huge loss, but the war was far from over.
Thousands were lost, it was a painful moment.
But this genocidal act did not achieve Rhodesia’s intended results.
It was meant to break the spirit, sap the morale and send freedom fighters into dark corners.
But it had the opposite effect.
Freedom fighters were emboldened and inspired to fight harder.
Once the fallen fighters had been buried, the ZANLA High Command was back at the drawing board.
Attacks were intensified.
Prior to the massacre at Chimoio, plans had been put in motion to destroy a Rhodesian air base in Manicaland, the Grand Reef Airbase in Mutare (Umtali).
Rhodesia’s Grand Reef Air Base in Manicaland was a large and strategic Forward Airfield (FAF) which became one of the key operational centres for Rhodies.
A FAF was an airfield out of which aircraft operated supporting the depreciating Rhodesian forces.
It carried out cross-border raids on guerilla camps in Mozambique and Zambia.
Some of the helicopters used during the Chimoio attack had come from Grand Reef.
Furthermore, 10 helicopters were stationed there as reserve during the attack itself.
To crown it all, Grand Reef was used as a recovery base for the Rhodesian troops who took part in the Chimoio attack.
The ZANLA High Command soon concluded the Grand Reef Air Base had to be destroyed.
And barely a month after the Chimoio massacre, fired-up ZANLA forces paid Grand Reef a visit — one the Rhodesians never expected.
The attack was tactful and carried out swiftly.
It was towards Christmas and the Rhodies were in a festive mood, still celebrating the ‘successful’ bombing of Chimoio.
After a reconnaissance mission and meticulous planning that would impress the best minds in the history of war, the guerillas attacked on December 18 1977.
This was no hit and run mission.
Having surrounded the air base, commander during the attack, Cde Steven Chocha, now Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, ordered his troops to fire.
Possessing advanced firepower, the base was razed to the ground and not a single plane took off as all the aircraft was destroyed.
After the attack, the freedom fighters packed up their gear and walked away as if daring the Rhodies to follow, but none did as they remained behind licking their wounds.
This pattern of hitting Rhodesian strategic bases continued and Rhodies abandoned their camps.
Less than three weeks after the Grand Reef attack, on January 12 1978, ZANLA forces hit hard another FAF Base.
This time the target was the Mutoko Fire Force in action.
The Rhodesian Air force had nine Forward Airfields bases.
The FAF1 (Wankie, now Hwange), FAF2 (Kariba), FAF3 (Centenary), FAF4 (Mount Darwin), FAF5 (Mutoko), FAF6 (Chipinge), FAF7 (Buffalo Range), FAF8 (Grand Reef), and FAF9 (Rutenga).
Air Force Commander P.J.H. Petter-Bowyer called the FAF5 attack ‘Black Friday’.
The helicopters at the base were destroyed.
It was an aircraft massacre.
And by 1978, the war had spread throughout Rhodesia.
With this escalation came increasing sophistication and organisation on the part of the guerillas.
ZIPRA forces, operating from Zambia, also became a force to reckon with as they won battle-after-battle against the Rhodesian forces.
ZIPRA scored big against the Rhodesians when they downed two Air Rhodesian planes in 1978 and 1979.
On September 3 1978, ZIPRA forces shot down an Air Rhodesia plane using an SA-7 surface-to-air missile.
The attack was designed to demoralise the Ian Smith regime and force it to capitulate.
After this attack, many Rhodesians emigrated.
Five months later, another Viscount was downed.
On February 9 1979, a commercial Air Rhodesia Viscount was struck by a Soviet SAM-7 missile after taking off from the resort town of Kariba in the northern part Rhodesia.
Rhodesian army supremo General Peter Walls was meant to be on the flight, but it is said his wife changed their itinerary at the eleventh hour.
By then, Rhodesians were desperate, admitting that the ‘penetration’ and ‘disruption’ by guerilla forces had increased and they were overstretched.
Rhodesia was using more than 45 percent of its budget to sustain the war.
In December 1978, ZANLA forces made another huge step by taking their campaign to the heart of Salisbury (Harare) when they blew up the BP Shell fuel storage tanks in the capital.
The attack severely crippled the country.
Half a million barrels of petroleum products, 40 percent of Rhodesia’s fuel supplies, was destroyed.
The regime’s motorised battalions had difficulties in carrying out their daily raids on the civilian population.
Finding the guerillas too huge a force to repel and their operating areas increasing while their numbers thinned, Rhodesians called for talks at the Lancaster House in London.
The Lancaster House Conference, which would provide the decisive settlement, started on September 10 1979 in London.
On the side-lines of the Lancaster House talks, hostilities did not cease between the warring factions back in Rhodesia.
In October 1979, the huge ZANLA base at Mavonde (Monte Casino) was attacked.
The Battle of Mavonde became a decisive factor in the independence of Zimbabwe as it took place at the preliminary stages of the Lancaster House talks.
Mavonde was the ZANLA headquarters in Manicaland situated close to Hauna Growth Point in Honde Valley, about 20km from the Mozambican border.
It accommodated mostly newly-trained cadres who were yet to cut their milk teeth, although there were many who had fighting experience already.
The Rhodesians thought it would be a simple operation with their Special Forces, Canberra, Hawk Hunter, Spitfire, Vampire and Alloute3 helicopters; it would be a stroll in the park they assumed.
And after winning this battle, they expected to have their way at the ongoing talks in London.
They also had Mirage fighters from Israel.
In fact, had they defeated the guerillas, Ian Smith and his kith and kin would have pulled out of the Lancaster talks.
Mavonde was without doubt the most decisive battle of the liberation struggle.
Whoever achieved victory in the battle would get a distinct advantage in the talks.
Rhodesians were determined to win, but they underestimated ZANLA forces and after a five-day intensive battle, Rhodesians were repelled under heavy fire from the ‘Stalin Organ’, an anti-aircraft gun.
The Rhodesians surrendered and on December 28 1979, they signed the ceasefire agreement.
As we reflect on November 23 1977, it must be noted that the Chimoio Massacre, dubbed Operation Dingo by Rhodesians, gave guerillas a new impetus and spurred them to victory.