THE people of Chiweshe communal lands will always talk of Kid Marongorongo, Solomon Ngoni and James Bond who operated there in the post-Altena phase.
All of them were killed in fire-fights during the same period, but their names are permanently imprinted in the Chimurenga roll of honour.
Through the Chigwete brothers, I stumbled upon the name Clever Mabhonzo who led units in Madziwa communal lands sometime in 1973 and 1974 around the same time we hear of Marongorongo and company in Chiweshe.
This was ZANLA on the offensive.
The Chigwete brothers were war collaborators of note in Madziva communal lands.
Like most effective operators, their activities were only known to a few.
For many, they were just another group of mujibhas.
They are still around, so they will tell their own story.
Like many others, I have always split the Second Chimurenga into three phases and they are based on historical realities on the ground.
The first starts in 1964 with the Crocodile Gang, ending around 1968/69 with little progress.
The second is marked by the attack on Altena Farm in Centenary on December 21 1972, a culmination of many months of mobilisation and building up of war materials.
ZANLA moved into the Dande Valley along Zambezi River and lived among the local population for two years mobilising support, conducting reconnaissance while bringing in arms and ammunition from Zambia.
By the time they attacked Altena Farm, the comrades had firmly established themselves within the local population in the north-eastern area of the country such that Rhodesian forces failed to drive them out despite their superior firepower and logistical support.
The sustained operations through the next two years shook the very foundations of the bhunu establishment and prompted the West, through Henry Kissinger, to re-think on how to stem the relentless march of vana vevhu to Harare.
The operations of few brave men have assumed legendary proportions and have become epics.
Each detachment, each sector of the Tete Province, many heroes, many who remain unsung yet, it is their heroic feats that pushed mabhunu to their limits, compelling them to release Cde Robert Mugabe and the others in 1974 to start serious talks during the period that came to be called Detente.
The third phase is the post-Detente phase from 1976 to the end of the war in 1980.
I have dwelt substantively on the last phase mainly because this is the period when I saw active service in the ranks of ZANLA.
However, the post-Detente phase grows directly out of the daring exploits of the post-Altena phase in the north-eastern area.
Cde Mabhonzo’s area of operation stretched from Pfura Mountain of Darwin in the north to Umfurudzi River in the south.
It was a narrow belt of villages in the land of Chief Madziva and Chief Mutumba.
To the west it was hemmed in by the Matepatepa hills and to the east, it was bound by the Umfurudzi Safari area that gave way to Chesa Purchase Area further east.
I can only speculate what Mabhonzo looked like, but I will comfortably assume he had exceptional leadership qualities, excellent oratory skills with formidable powers of persuasion.
He was a man with unfathomable reserves of courage and resilience that drove him on to endure the near impossible conditions of operating in an area where the people had been headed into the detestable ‘Keeps’.
I never got to know Mabhonzo’s level of command, but from the narratives of the villagers he looked fairly senior, possibly Detachment level.
I am told he was quiet, unassuming, a soft-spoken gentleman who worked well with the community he lived in.
It looks like he was a gifted Political Commissar who spelt the aims of ZANLA elaborately.
It was never easy to operate in areas where there were concentrated villages, yet Cde Mabhonzo and his unit actually thrived and carried out operations with considerable success.
Cde Mabhonzo was a leader with vision.
You can discern this from his leadership policy.
Long before it was sanctioned from the rear, he was training and arming recruits.
This only became policy four long years later when camps in Zambia and Mozambique could no longer manage the large numbers of recruits coming from Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia).
As early as 1973, he saw the need to carry out operations in Salisbury (Harare).
Realising it was too risky for guerillas to carry out urban operations, he had a solution; train and arm collaborators.
He did this well before it was officially sanctioned around 1977.
He trained the collaborators to use small arms and hand-grenades.
From his base in Madziva, Mabhonzo master-minded a daring operation that reflects his military prowess as a strategist.
He directed an operation to be carried out in Harare.
It was carried out by Damian Chigwete with the support of his brother, Claudius, a cousin Cecil Kamangira and an accomplice called Borden.
A grenade was thrown into La Boheme Night Club in the heart of Salisbury’s central business district.
No arrests were made.
And 42 years later, the Chigwete brothers have the story, fresh as if it happened yesterday.
They have vivid memories of Cde Mabhonzo and how he planned and directed them to carry out the operations.
The end of Cde Mabhonzo is very sad indeed.
His unit was attacked in Katambarare Base, a mountain range some 10 kilometres to the west of Bradley institute.
After a fire-fight that lasted all day, Cde Mabhonzo was captured, one guerilla escaped, the rest were killed.
After capturing him, mabhunu broke his legs and then paraded him in the villages before taking him to Salisbury.
Records indicate he was executed sometime at Chikurubi Maximum Prison in 1974 or 1975.
Like many of his ilk, Cde Mabhonzo left a permanent footprint in Madziva communal land.
He is one of those heroes who carved up new spaces that enabled subsequent waves to surge forward when the struggle resumed in full force in 1976.
We owe our freedom to heroes such as Cde Mabhonzo.

NB: (I owe this story to the Chigwete brothers)