By Major Special Matarirano

IN 1985, the gravity of the Mozambican National Resistance  Army (RENAMO)’s threat to Zimbabwe’s national security was clear.
Sabotaging of crucial transportation infrastructure was gradually undermining Zimbabwe’s economic independence, while the increasing possibility of state collapse in Mozambique threatened its political stability.
Zimbabwe’s right to a port was being grossly violated by the rebels; economic goods being ferried along the Beira corridor were under attack, as well as the Beira to Mutare pipeline.
To compound matters, elements within RENAMO declared an intention to expand the war into Zimbabwe, with the seemingly complicity of Zimbabwe opposition leader Ndabaningi Sithole, then in exile in the United States.
RENAMO bandits, in search of food, made repeated incursions into Manicaland province, Chiredzi and Mwenezi districts in Zimbabwe.
Short and interesting narratives of how Zimbabwe reacted to the above developments can easily set us on an intriguing journey of military operational prudence as follows;
In one incident, intelligence sources had indicated that RENAMO’S main regional base in Manica Province was at Muxamba and with Casa Banana in Gorongosa being the national stronghold.
Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration, however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert RENAMO’S attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the three heavily armed Zimbabwean Infantry Battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongosa Mountains.
Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 RENAMO elements commanded by Major General Mabachi.
The attack on Muxamba was launched on August 20 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Parachute Group and the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF).
On Cassa Banana, intelligence sources had also reviewed that the RENAMO’S national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements.
However, RENAMO maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongosa Mountains, which were considered part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements.
During the night of August 27 1985, three Zimbabwe Infantry Battalions formed up in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Commando elements. At Chimoio a Fireforce was given a final briefing and five AFZ bombers were on standby for a first- light take-off for Gorongosa on the morning of August 28 1985.
Some RENAMO elements captured at Katiyo Tea Estates in Manicaland Province had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several RENAMO bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongosa Mountains was the actual headquarters.
It was because of this uncertainty that the Fireforce was divided into three sections each with helicopter gunships, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers.
Each Fireforce section was detailed to attack specific suspected RENAMO positions around the Gorongosa Mountains.
It was during this three-pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana.
The jets from Thornhill, which were already in place overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then raised on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began.
The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti-Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flush out several pockets of resistance.
A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers.
When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions.
The Fireforce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller RENAMO bases all along the Gorongosa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance.
As one can discern, the history of Zimbabwe is full of classical literature of struggle and warfare. Warfare has characterised the greater part of the Zimbabwean society since the pre-colonial period.
Narratives of these wars have not been properly documented much to the detriment of the younger generation.
These generations remain disenfranchised from the instructional complicity of our history. Military history, the world, over shapes the image and power of any nation in the eyes of its people or adversaries.
History, as derived from the Greek noun ‘historia’ meaning ‘inquiry or research’, is to the human race, what memory is to each man.
It sheds the light of the past upon the present, thus helping one to understand oneself, by making one acquainted with other peoples. Also, as one studies the rise and fall of empires and civilisations, the lessons of the past help one to avoid the pitfalls of the present.
The Mozambican war has largely remained an oral traditional war where the exploits of the ZDF has remained anchored on individuals experiences and worldviews.
There are no books written on it, no feature films nor documentary films on it. Its narrative will only survive up to the space and time that those who fought in it would be allowed to grace this land space by God, and it’s to be forgotten, eroded and overtaken by events. It is therefore the writer’s plea for the powers that be to institutionalise the Mozambican war through the granting of authority and sponsorship for documentary films and compilation of creative books on it.