AT the peak of his borrowed powers, Ian Douglas Smith had become so arrogant that it never dawned on him the unification in October 1976 of nationalist groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) to form the Patriotic Front (PF) would pose serious threats to his hegemonic control of Zimbabwe.
The Patriotic Front, one of the several unity agreements between the two liberation movements soon became a formidable force with a novelty that not only attracted global attention, but mounted a serious challenge to Smith’s wretched rule.
The Smith regime had been an albatross on the necks of aggrieved Zimbabweans since his ill-fated November 11 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
But this time, there was no excuse not to write him and his Rhodesia off as the PF, a political and military alliance with solid backing from the Frontline States and the masses, became the mouthpiece at international fora.
The objective of the PF was to overthrow the predominantly white minority Government, headed by the then Prime Minister Smith, through political pressure and military force.
Among other things, the PF strength lay in its ability to neutralise Smith’s trademark strategy of crippling his opponents through infiltrating them.
And the PF did not give Smith an inch.
They knew that as a united entity, the Smith regime would not survive and they did just that as they went to the Geneva Conference armed with the mantle of unity.
In 1976, a combination of the pressure of guerilla activity, embargo-related economic hardships, independence and majority rule in the neighbouring former Portuguese territories as well as a United Kingdom and US diplomatic initiative, the unrecognised and widely discredited Smith Government agreed in principle to majority rule and to a meeting in Geneva with black nationalist leaders to seek an end to the conflict.
Black representatives at the Geneva meeting included ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, ZANU leader Robert Mugabe, UANC chairman Bishop Abel Muzorewa and former ZANU leader Rev Nadabaningi Sithole.
The meeting failed to find a basis for agreement because of Smith’s inflexibility and the inability of the black leaders to form a common political front.
Even arranging the conference proved a struggle, with the Rhodesians taking exception to being served cards of admittance on October 27 denoting them ‘The Smith Delegation’, rather than the ‘Rhodesian Government Delegation’ as had happened in previous conferences and correspondence.
On the morning of October 29, Cdes Mugabe and Nkomo spoke in turn, giving emotionally charged speeches about the ‘dreadful sacrifices which the white governments have exacted from the poor black people’.
Neither made any comment relevant to a new Constitution
The purpose of the conference was to attempt to agree on a new Constitution for Rhodesia and in so doing, find a way to end the bush war raging between the government and the freedom fighters commanded by Cde Mugabe and Nkomo respectively.
This position was flatly rejected by President Mugabe and Dr Nkomo while Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole agreed to what Smith wanted.
On September 1 1977, an Anglo-American plan was put forward with proposals for what they said would be ‘majority rule’, a neutrally administered establishment with pre-independence elections, a democratic Constitution and the formation of an integrated army.
The reactions were mixed, but no party rejected them.
On March 3 1978, the Smith administration signed the ‘Internal Settlement’ agreement in Salisbury with Bishop Muzorewa, Rev Sithole, James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and Chief Jeremiah Chirau.
The agreement, which excluded the PF, provided for qualified majority rule and elections with universal suffrage.
Elections were held in April 1979 and the UANC party won a majority.
Bishop Muzorewa assumed office on June 1, becoming Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s first black prime minister.
However, this did not end the war.
Feeling the heat from the PF, which continued to receive more support from the frontline states, Smith attempted to avoid more military confrontation by initiating mediated talks with the more ‘peace’-inclined Bishop Muzorewa.
Without the PF, the ‘Internal Settlement’ was always going to be a fragile entity, especially in the wake of the ferocious course the war had taken.
The PF fiercely challenged the ‘Internal Settlement’ to the extent that the international community refused to recognise Bishop Muzorewa’s regime as the legitimate Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
This strengthened the PF’s position going into the Lancaster House talks.
With his options running out and the liberation war fighters adopting the Maliza Maliza (Swahili for ‘let’s finish it up!) stance in 1979, Smith once again tried to play one of the few remaining cards in his deck, the Fifth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) that was held in Lusaka in August 1979.
It was there that Julius Nyerere openly told the Conservatives’ newly-installed government head, Margaret Thatcher, that Zimbabweans were making significant inroads in their quest to take over their country.
This, coupled with the sustained onslaught by the guerillas, proved to be the final nail on Smith’s coffin.
Following the CHOGM meeting, the British government invited Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the PF to participate in a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House.
The purpose of the Conference, which took place from September 10 to December 15 1979, with 47 plenary sessions, was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution, to agree on the holding of elections under British authority and to enable Zimbabwe – Rhodesia to proceed to lawful and internationally recognised independence, with the parties settling their differences by political means.
The most important message that emerges from the formation of the PF is that, unity between ZANU and ZAPU did not start on December 22 1987.
It started way before and the leaders did it for the love of their beloved country, Zimbabwe.