By Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu

THE Zimbabwe liberation movements had, naturally, hoped that the struggle would be over and that Zimbabwe would be free sooner than later.
But they had seen with much astonishment, the Smith regime first declare independence in 1965 and second, declare the country a republic in 1969, and the British Government had adamantly refused to intervene militarily each time Ian Douglas Smith committed treason by usurping power from the British Crown.
Frustration began to creep into the liberation movements as some armed cadres at the camps in the operational areas started to complain about the top party leaders’ social behaviour back in the offices in Lusaka.
It started towards the end of 1971 with ZAPU guerillas whose complaint was that the political leadership did not care about their welfare in that they would sometimes go for weeks without receiving any food and medicine supplies.
Another complaint was that their security was compromised by unnecessary publicity in the print media.
That was a reference to an article published by a South African monthly magazine, Scope, in which photographs of some guerillas prominently featured.
The article was published with the authority of ZAPU deputy president, James Robert Dambaza Chikerema, who was an avid publicity seeker, the exact opposite of what a good guerilla leader and commander should be.
He was the supreme commander of the ZAPU guerillas and was deputised by Jason ‘Ziyaphapha’ Moyo, popularly called ‘JZ’, a publicity-shy and deeply-committed nationalist.
Guerilla complaints led to a crisis in ZAPU in 1972 and Chikerema pulled out of that organisaton and formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).
He broke away with the ZAPU secretary-general, George ‘Bonzo’ Nyandoro.
JZ started to rebuild the party’s guerilla army which was up to that time (1972) referred to simply as ‘Special Affairs’.
After Chikerema’s breakaway, ZAPU guerillas were given the name, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, ZIPRA, whose first commander was, Rogers ‘Nikita’ Mangena, a very intelligent Algeria-trained young man who replaced Ackim Matthew Ndlovu, another intelligent but Soviet Union-trained ZAPU product.
Meanwhile, in the ZANU camp, a more or less similar development occurred in 1974, about two to three years after the ZAPU experience.
In ZANU, a group of guerillas led by Thomas Nhari revolted and almost paralysed the armed struggle as their action resulted in the death of highly committed revolutionaries such as John Mataure and in March 1975 to that of the ZANU national chairman, a renowned lawyer, Advocate Herbert Chitepo.
By the time of Chitepo’s death, the ZANU armed wing led by Josiah Magama Tongogara had been given the name the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA).
The disturbances slowed down but did not destroy the armed struggle.
Both organisations increased the number of their military recruits and the content of their training progammes were improved.
Mozambique’s attainment of independence in June 1975 sealed the Rhodesian regime’s fate, and rendered the South African apartheid administration more vulnerable than before.
Angola’s independence the same year (1975) enabled the Namibian freedom fighters of South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), and the South African ANC to move into Namibia using Angola as their base.
The US Government read and interpreted the situation correctly and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, launched a regional diplomatic campaign called ‘détente’.
It involved talks leading to the formation of administrations, members of which included some malleable nationalists, downright opportunists and some representatives of the fascist regime of South Africa.
In Zimbabwe, détente did not succeed although ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo held a series of discredited meetings in Salisbury with Ian Smith.
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU) had all the time been pressuring ZAPU and ZANU to unite in order to be more effective militarily and diplomatically.
The two liberation movements had then tried to unite their respective guerilla forces, ZIPRA and ZANLA, under what they called the Zimbabwe People’s Army, ZIPA, soon after their internal problems.
ZIPA did not last long as there was no wish in the ZIPRA and ZANLA top echelons for it to replace those two guerillas armies.
However, in October 1976, the OAU pressure resulted in ZANU and ZAPU coming together under a loose umbrella organisation called the Patriotic Front (PF) whose formation was publicly announced at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, Dar es Salaam that very month (October).
In the war front, ZANLA was covering more and more ground in Zimbabwe’s north-eastern and eastern regions and ZIPRA was entrenched in Mashonaland West and in both Matabeleland North and the western sector of Matabeleland South.
That was what the situation was when the British Government convened a (constitutional) conference in Geneva in late October 1976.
While Ian Smith and a couple of his Rhodesian regime colleagues were arguing with freedom fighters in Geneva about when the freedom fighters could take over their country’s government, fighting continued unabated in all fronts.
Chaired by Britain’s United Nations representative, Sir Ivor Richards, that useless conference dragged on until the end of the year when it was postponed indefinitely.
The liberation movements’ leaders returned in the first week of January to their respective bases, PF ZAPU to Lusaka, Zambia, and ZANU PF to Maputo, Mozambique.
Tragedy struck the Zimbabwe revolutionaries, particularly, those of ZAPU when on January 23 1977 a parcel bomb killed JZ in the Lusaka ZAPU offices.
It was a great loss comparable only to that caused by Advocate Herbert Chitepo’s death in March 1975.
JZ Moyo’s burial in Lusaka was attended by a very large number of African national leaders including Robert Mugabe, who went from Maputo to Zambia to represent his party, ZANU-PF, at that sad event.
Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu is a retired, Bulawayo-based journalist. He can be contacted on cell 0734 328 136 or through email: sgwakuba@gmail.com