Large quantities of arms and ammunition: AK-rifles, anti-aircraft guns, recoilless guns, 60mm and 82mm mortars were supplied by China, Yugoslavia and Romania. China went further to supply huge quantities of medicines and bandages, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book The Struggle For Land in Zimbabwe (1890-2010) that The Patriot is serialising.

AFTER the arrest of the rebellious ZIPA committee members in January 1977, the remaining ZANU leadership and the ZANLA High Command went all-out mobilising resources for the intensification of the liberation struggle.
The ZANLA rear base camps of Chimoio HQ, Tembwe and Mapai needed urgent re-supplies of food, medicines and clothing as well as arms and ammunition; so did the operations and training bases in Tete, Manica and Gaza provinces.
The refugee camps of Doroi, Chibawawa and Tembwe presented special concern.
By July 1977, the population of Doroi had sky-rocketed to 35 000.
Large quantities of arms and ammunition — AK-rifles, anti-aircraft guns, recoilless guns, 60mm and 82mm mortars — were supplied by China, Yugoslavia and Romania.
China went further to supply huge quantities of medicines and bandages.
A theatre-equipped UNIMOG Ambulance was donated by well-wishers from West Germany in solidarity with Zimbabweans living there. Another group known as ‘People-to-People’ mobilised heavy transport vehicles from the Scandinavian countries.
The historic Chimoio Congress
In September 1977, the historic Chimoio Congress completely re-organised and restructured the ZANU Party. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: p.275)
A new Central Committee which accommodated ZANU leaders detained inside Rhodesia, leaders who had been detained at Mpima Prison in Zambia and some strong leaders from the ZANLA High Command was elected.
Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the former Secretary-General of ZANU was elected First Secretary and President of ZANU.
Comrade Simon Vengesai Muzenda became the Second Secretary and Vice-President of ZANU.
Comrade Edgar Tekere became the Secretary-General.
Comrade Josiah Magama Tongogara became the Secretary for Defence and Chief of Defence (COD).
The new ZANLA command structure
The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU, was well-represented within the party structure.
With ZANU, the party, completely restructured, and its military wing, ZANLA, strengthened; with discipline in virtually all camps and on the operation front restored; with arms, ammunition and medical supplies in abundance; the armed struggle could only intensify.
Attempts to eliminate ZANLA bases inside Mozambique
As early as May 1977, after the failure of the Geneva Conference in 1976, the Rhodesians made a concerted effort to eliminate ZANLA bases inside Mozambique so as to facilitate an internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and James Chikerema by March 1978.
The Battle of Mapai: May 29 1977
On May 29 1977, over 700 Rhodesian security forces raided Mapai in the Gaza Province (Sobel 1978: p.118) believing the base was a key staging post for ZANLA infiltration into Rhodesia. (Cole, 1984: p.329).
During the operation, aRhodesian Dakota (D-C3) with an unknown number of Rhodesian security forces was shot down on take-off resulting in the death of the pilot, Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott on May 30 1977.
The aircraft burst into flames on impact at the end of the runway, but the co-pilot, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Lynch and an important passenger, Brigadier Pat Hill from COMOPS were said to have miraculously survived the crash. (Jackshon and Van Malsen, 2011: p.202)
As a result, the operation was prolonged in an effort to salvage the wreckage and the dead. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.149)
An eventual withdrawal on June 2 1977 ended the five-day humiliation.
And, interestingly, they only admitted to the loss of one helicopter pilot killed in the operation and claimed that most of the ZANLA guerilla bases which they had intended to capture had been abandoned before the raid. (Sobel, 1978: p.118)
The Chimoio Raid: November 23 1977
Coming after the Mapai disaster, the bigger raid on the Chimoio ZANLA Rear Base HQ and the Tembwe Rear Base in Mozambique was in another sense also intended to recover lost pride. The double assault, code-named ‘Operation Dingo’, was a declaration of an all out war on ZANLA guerilla bases in Mozambique and was the bloodiest air and ground attack ever carried out by the Rhodesians inside Mozambique. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: p.288)
It involved 97 Special Air Service (SAS), 48 Rhodesia Light Infantry (RLI), 40 heliborne forces, 30 para-reservists, four medics and one doctor (Sunday Mail August 16 1998).
The majority of the SAS forces were foreign mercenary special forces who included British, American and the South African Squadron ‘D’ SAS forces.
The Rhodesian Airforce included 4 Canberra B-2 bombers, eight Hawker-Hunter fighter jets, four Vampire fighter jets, 12 Lynxes (Reims Cessna FTB 337G), 42 Alouette III K-Car and G-Car helicopters as well as six Dakota (DC-3) aircraft for para-trooping. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.150)
A DC-7 was specifically assigned to para-drop over 240 drums of Jet A1 fuel for use by helicopters involved in the raid. Also, even though the operational orders assigned a DC-3 Dakota the deception role designed to optimise the advantage of surprise (Cocks, 2011: p.274), it was actually a civilian DC-8 which ended up performing the ruse.
The roar of the DC-8 was intended to mask the approach of the invading aircraft (Wood 2011: p.30 / Cole, 1984: p.180) and,incidentally, it is critical to note that the Rhodesian Airforce certainly did not have DC-7s or DC-8s in its inventory. (Cocks, 2011: p.268) This means that the aircraft were loaned from somewhere, and specifically for the Chimoio raid. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: pp.56;96)
And, they would not be the only aircraft on loan.
The SAAF did provide the Rhodesians with much support and training, especially for external raids.
The Rhodesians even manned one SAAF Mirage III squadron. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.56) The South Africans admitted to the role of their Mirage III when they claimed that the aircraft ‘… did not take part in war in Rhodesian Air Space, but they did provide a crucial back-up for security force raids into neighbouring states’. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 1982: p.96 -pictures)
The Warrior (a battle-configured SIAI Marchetti SF260/ Genet trainer) provided the spotter and striker roles for the mission.
The Rhodesian attack plan was to paradrop a combined force of 72 SAS and RLI paratroopers in the north-eastern part of Chimoio Camp, and the same combination of the two forces onto the south-eastern part of part of the camp while the 40 heliborne RLI forces were to be dropped directly in the eastern part of the camp.
The three groups of assaulting forces were to form a three-line encirclement of the camp and a line of K-Car helicopters was to complete the encirclement and box-in the occupants. (Wood 2011: pp.30-32 /Cole, 1984: p.176)
An Alouette III G-Car was to be used as a mobile command post carrying both the commander of the ground force, Major Brian Robinson (SAS) and the commander of the Airforce, Group-Captain Norman Walsh who would be flying it. (Cocks, 2011: p.282)
General Peter Walls was to be the overall commander, operating from a Dakota circling the northern part of the camp.