IN this time of the year we remember and celebrate the unparalleled exploits of the ZANLA supremo, its Chief of Defence, Josiah Magama Tongogara
December 26 1979 robbed us of our supremo, Josiah Tongogara.
It is not possible to forget this great son of the land of Murenga, a great friend of the people of Zimbabwe, a brother, a dedicated fighter and defender of the land.
We can never be reconciled to this loss in our lives, but above all we cannot fail to celebrate his heroism which led our people to victory.
You did attain victory comrade, what you missed were the celebrations and the opportunity of building with us an ever great Zimbabwe.
We shall never be at peace about your loss son of Murenga, remember us to Musikavanhu, great son of Zimbabwe.
In honour of your dedicated and illustrious leadership of ZANLA we want to celebrate some of the most illustrious moments of ZANLA.

At Lancaster, you told the British you would go back to the battlefield if the white man insisted you buy back your land, the land you had liberated through a bitter armed struggle.
“If the London Conference reaches no decision, we will dispatch our men back to Africa. This means the intensification of the struggle. We can win without Lancaster House. That is a certainty. Of course we would welcome a settlement. But we can achieve peace and justice for our people through the barrel of the gun” (Mugabe:1979).
The liberation forces, ZANU and ZAPU stood firm that the African people of Zimbabwe would never buy back their land which had been parcelled out to white farmers as a right of conquest, because that right of conquest had been reversed by the conquering liberation forces who now had the right to take back the land and return it to Africans, the indigenous owners of this land, their ancestral land.
Land dispossession had been the bitterest grievance among Zimbabwe’s African people.
The ZANLA forces in particular had actively mobilised the rural people for the armed struggle, more on the basis of the land issue, than on any other single issue throughout the whole of Zimbabwe.

We are proud of and we celebrate this resolute position not only of ZANU but of the Patriotic Front, which led to the resolution of the land issue.
Because of this the British and Americans had to agree to pay for the purchase of the land that would be liberated from white farmers for distribution to the masses and this resolved the issue leading to the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement on December 21.
At this time when you left us, we remember and celebrate your illustrious exploits.
We remember with deep pride your Deputy, ZANLA Chief of Operations, Comrade Nhongo opening the North Eastern Frontier with shots at Altena Farm.
On the night of December 21 1972, after cutting telephone communications and mining the road to the farm, Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), a deputy, Jairos and a detachment of nine guerrillas attacked the farm using AK 47 assault rifles, and RPG 7 rocket launchers.
After the opening of this frontier, the war of liberation was never the same.
Less than a month after the Chimoio massacre, 60 ZANLA commandos from the Chimoio ZANLA Operations Base overran Rhodesia’s Grand Reef Security Air Force Base without a single casualty on the ZANLA side, the Commander was cde Stephen Chocha, former police Commissioner-Genral, Augustine Chihuru. Five days later this force reinforced by a 40 man artillery unit attacked the 3 Brigade HQ right in the heart of Mutare.
We celebrate this feat by ZANLA.
Your young ZANLA forces were Ian Smith’s nightmare.
On December 11 1978 only just a year after the Chimoio massacre, a section of young ZANLA guerillas in their late teens and early 20’s blew up Rhodesia’s Southerton fuel reserves depot.
They got away undetected.
Memorable tribute to your great military prowess.
September 1-6 1979, in the battle of Mapai Dominic Chinenge now Zimbabwe’s Vice President, drafted an epitaph on the grave of Rhodesia when he routed Rhodesians out of Mapai.
He was the Provincial Commander of Gaza Province and commanded ZANLA in the Battle of Mapai.
The FRELIMO forces were commanded by Brigadier Fondo.
The Rhodesians planned to capture Mapai, drive out ZANLA and FRELIMO from the city and take control of this vital link between Rhodesian and South Africa.
Felix Muchemwa, the ZANLA veteran guerilla and medical practitioner, describes the defeat of the Rhodesians in this epic battle:
“At one point, such heavy machine gun fire forced Commander Wilson and a few of his troops to make a hasty retreat behind an anthill for cover but within seconds, the anthill melted in front of their eyes, grazed to almost ground level by a concentrated and sustained heavy machine gun fire. … the Rhodesians and South Africans were forced to make an uncharacteristic and hasty retreat. More than 50 Rhodesian and South African soldiers were killed including those who had died in
the Puma, and another helicopter that had been shot down. Again and for the first time the Rhodesians and the South Africans were unable to recover the bodies of their fallen…” (Muchemwa:2015).
This defeat was despite that the South
Africans had contributed heavily to the Rhodesian arsenal:
13 Pumas (with troops and logistics)
2 Super ferlons (with troops and logistics)
4 Canberra bombers
4 Dakota transport aircraft (DC’s)
Mirage and Buccanneer strike aircraft
The two surveillance aircraft or Warthogs circled high above Kruger National Park, only a few kilometres South of Mapai inside South Africa. One was entirely South African, and the other carried the Commander of Combined operations, General Peter Walls, the Rhodesian Air force Director of Operations, Norman Walsh, and Brigadier Van Loggerenberg, The Commander of Rhodeisa’s ground forces, Major Pat Armstrong flew in a specially adapted Lynx with ten hours endurance. Captain Dave Padbury of the SAS, flew in a similar Lynx ready to command in case the commander had to land (Muchemwa:2015)
The Rhodesian and South African ground force was 388, and close to the Mozambican border an SADF base had on standby a parachute battalion.
With such a massive arsenal, the Rhodesians and South Africans had hoped for a decisive victory to strengthen Rhodesia’s hand at the Lancaster House Conference which was due to start on September 10 but your ZANLA denied them victory, instead it was ZANU’s hand which was strengthened at Lancaster.
Still pursuing their mission to steal victory from the freedom fighters, Rhodeisans attacked Mavonde ZANLA HQ BASe (2-4 October 1979) only 20 kms from the Rhodesian border. The aim still was to weaken ZANU’s hand at the negotiations at Lancaster.
The ZANLA force was 6 000 strong heavily armed with rifles, machine guns and rocket launchers.
Comrade Nhongo, ZANLA Chief of Operations was in command at Mavhonde.
The strategy of the Rhodesians was that:
The aerial bombardment would remain the same as at Mapai but the ground force would be supported by an artillery battery of 25 pounder guns, as well as Eland Armoured cars mounted with 90mm guns. A. 100 men shock assault force, was to advance into the Mavonde ZANLA HQ Base in two columns of 10 Unimog armoured cars. The Unimog (Pigs), mounted with 14.5mm NS 12.7mm heavy machine guns (HMG’s)… were to go for a frontal attack on the Mavonde ZANLA HQ Base (Muchemwa:2015).
The aerial bombardment would be simultaneous with the frontal attack of the armoured cars.
It was a fierce four-day battle, at the end of which Rhodesia became thoroughly frightened of ZANLA such that after briefly occupying the Mavonde base, they ‘suspected and got scared of a counter attack by FRELIMO and ZANLA using the much feared BM21, 122mm rocket launchers and promptly decided to evacuate Mavonde back to Rhodesia the quickest way out.
ZANLA lost five forces, and according to FRELIMO, Rhodesians lost 120 men and six fighter aircraft.
Still it was ZANU’s hand that was strengthened at Lancaster not that of the Rhodesian aggressors.
We salute you Comrade Tongogara, ZANLA Chief of Defence for the unparalleled Exploits of ZANLA.